Indispensability Arguments in Favour of Reductive Explanations |
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Authors: | Jeroen Van Bouwel Erik Weber Leen De Vreese |
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Institution: | (1) Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium |
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Abstract: | Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world
are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this
paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments
for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests.
Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking
question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability
of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels,
we argue that explanatory reduction—traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism—can be defended in a similar way.
The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is
illustrated by some case studies. |
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