PERSPECTIVE‐NEUTRAL INTRINSIC VALUE |
| |
Authors: | JUSTIN KLOCKSIEM |
| |
Institution: | Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama |
| |
Abstract: | Is it possible to do a good thing, or to make the world a better place? Some argue that it is not possible, because perspective‐neutral value does not exist. Some argue that ‘good’ does not play the right grammatical role; or that all good things are good ‘in a way’; or that goodness is inherently perspective‐dependent. I argue that the logical and semantic properties of ‘good’ are what we should expect of an evaluative predicate; that the many ways of being good don't threaten the thesis that some ways are perspective‐independent; and that there are clear examples of perspective‐independent goodness. |
| |
Keywords: | |
|
|