Distant Peers |
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Authors: | Mark Vorobej |
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Affiliation: | Department of Philosophy, McMaster University, , Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, L8S 4K1 |
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Abstract: | What is the nature of rational disagreement? A number of philosophers have recently addressed this question by examining how we should respond to epistemic conflict with a so‐called epistemic peer—that is, someone over whom you enjoy no epistemic advantage. Some say that you're rationally required to suspend judgment in these cases—thereby denying the very possibility of a certain kind of rational disagreement. Others say that it's permissible to retain your beliefs even in the face of epistemic conflict. By distinguishing between close peers and distant peers, I argue that it's rational to respond to different types of peers in different ways. I also argue that remote peers—a particularly distant kind of distant peer—provide us with an important lesson in epistemic humility. |
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Keywords: | rational disagreement epistemic conflict epistemic peer epistemic humility |
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