| Abstract: | Observing responses of college students and children of different ages (4 to 5, 9 to 10, and 13 to 14 years) were studied using two-component schedules of reinforcement. Different frequencies or numbers of points were given in the components and points were backed by either money or instructions about getting points (e.g., “points are for the experimenter's information only”). Stimuli that were either correlated or uncorrelated with the components were contingent on presses on either of two concurrently available levers (observing responses). In each of three experiments, preferences for stimuli were consistent with the conditioned-reinforcement hypothesis of observing but inconsistent with the uncertainty-reduction hypothesis. Stimulus preferences were established, eliminated, or reversed by instructions about the significance of getting points not backed with money. Instructions to in effect ignore points with no monetary value eliminated stimulus preference provided that money was not associated with points in other conditions for the same subjects. Stimulus preferences were otherwise independent of monetary point value. Instructions that described reinforcement contingencies promoted more rapid adjustment to the contingencies than occurred without them, and preferences were less variable across sessions within subjects and were on the average more extreme. Although some results involving absolute rates of observing depended upon the age of subjects, stimulus preferences did not. The data suggest that the conditioned-reinforcement hypothesis of observing has considerable generality for humans in choice procedures in the laboratory. That monetary value of points did not affect preferences in a graded fashion is consistent with versions of the conditioned-reinforcement hypothesis which emphasize reduction in delay to reinforcement over other reinforcement parameters. |
