On thought experiments as a priori science |
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Authors: | Richard Arthur |
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Affiliation: | Department of Philosophy , Middlebury College , Middlebury, VT, 05753, USA E-mail: arthur@middleburg.edu |
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Abstract: | Against Norton's claim that all thought experiments can be reduced to explicit arguments, I defend Brown's position that certain thought experiments yield a priori knowledge. They do this, I argue, not by allowing us to perceive “Platonic universals” (Brown), even though they may contain non‐propositional components that are epistemically indispensable, but by helping to identify certain tacit presuppositions or “natural interpretations” (Feyerabend's term) that lead to a contradiction when the phenomenon is described in terms of them, and by suggesting a new natural interpretation in terms of which the phenomenon can be redescribed free of contradiction. |
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