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休谟道德评价理论研究
引用本文:黄济鳌. 休谟道德评价理论研究[J]. 现代哲学, 2003, 0(3): 64-69
作者姓名:黄济鳌
作者单位:广东财经职业学院,广东,广州,510420
摘    要:休谟认为,道德评价的依据不能是理性,而是道德感;同情原则是道德感产生和发生作用的重要途径。笔者认为,休谟忽视了理性在道德评价中的重要作用;其道德感理论存在着理论困难,产生这种困难的原因是休谟不能理解理性与情感的辩证关系,以及他没有意识到客观的经济利益关系对道德评价的重要性。

关 键 词:理性 道德感 同情
文章编号:1000-7600(2003)03-0064-06

Investigation of Hume' s Theory of Moral Valuation
Huangjiao. Investigation of Hume' s Theory of Moral Valuation[J]. Modern Philosophy, 2003, 0(3): 64-69
Authors:Huangjiao
Abstract:In david Hume's view, The basis of moral judgement is not reason but moral sense ; The principle of sympathy is an important path by which moral sense arise and produce effects. In author's view, David Hume ignored the important role of reason in moral judgement; there is a theoretic predicament in his theory of moral sense , because David Hume could not comprehend the dialectical relation of reason and feeling , and he didn't realize the important role of objective economic relation to moral judgement.
Keywords:reason   naomi sense   sympathy
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