Conceptualism and the (Supposed) Non-Transitivity of Colour Indiscriminability |
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Authors: | Charlie Pelling |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Reading, RG6 6AA Reading, Oxford, UK |
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Abstract: | In this paper, I argue that those who accept the conceptualist view in the philosophy of perception should reject the traditional
view that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive. I start by outlining the general strategy that conceptualists have
adopted in response to the familiar ‘fineness of grain’ objection, and I show why a commitment to what I call the indiscriminability claim seems to form a natural part of this strategy. I then show how together, the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity claim –the claim that colour indiscriminability is non-transitive –entail a further, suspicious-looking claim that I call the problematic claim. My argument then splits into two parts. In the first part, I show why the conceptualist does indeed need to reject the problematic
claim. Given that this claim is jointly entailed by the indiscriminability claim and the non-transitivity claim, the conceptualist
is then left with a straight choice: reject the indiscriminability claim, or reject the non-transitivity claim. In the second
part, I then explain why the conceptualist should choose the latter option. |
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