Realization and the Formulation of Physicalism |
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Authors: | Andrew Melnyk |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211, USA |
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Abstract: | Twenty years ago, Richard Boyd suggested that physicalism could be formulated by appeal to a notion of realization, with no
appeal to the identity of the non-physical with the physical. In (Melnyk 2003), I developed this suggestion at length, on
the basis of one particular account of realization. I now ask what happens if you try to formulate physicalism on the basis
of other accounts of realization, accounts due to LePore and Loewer and to Shoemaker. Having explored two new formulations
of physicalism, I conclude that my 2003 formulation remains the most promising. |
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