从博弈游戏看儿童经济决策行为的发展

国外有研究借助最后通谍（UG）和独裁者博弈（DG）探查了儿童的决策行为，他们发现，随着儿童年龄的增长，他们分配给对方的金额呈上升趋势，即公平和分享行为随年龄增加。儿童的经济决策行为和社会化不可避免要受文化影响。研究探查了中国文化下小学三、六年级、初二、大学一年级四个年龄组学生在最后通谍（UG）和独裁者博弈（DG）中的经济决策行为发展。研究同时比较了个体决策和群体决策的差异。结果发现：儿童在两个博弈中的提议金额都显示出公平和分享行为，随着儿童年龄的增长，儿童在UG和随后进行的DG中的提议分配金额呈减少趋势。这个发现与以往国外研究结果明显不同。两个博弈的顺序对UG没有影响，但对DG有影响；儿童的个体决策和群体决策结果没有显示显著差异

The Development of Chinese Children's Decision-Making in Ultimatum and Dictator Games

There are few studies on how Chinese children make decisions. By using the ultimatum game (UG) and dictator game (DG), previous studies in Western countries found that children offer more as they grow older—in other words, they become increasingly inclined toward fairness. Several studies showed that Chinese children may have a different trajectory with regard to social cognition and social development due to cultural differences. Hence, we hypothesized that Chinese children may differ from their Western counterparts with regard to decision making. The study adopted the UG and DG to investigate decision-making development across different age groups among Chinese children. The participants recruited for this study were 3rd, 6th, and 8th graders, and freshmen aged 8, 11, 13 and 18 years, with 18 years as an endpoint of decision-making development. Participants were organized in groups of 3 persons, and there were around 16 groups in each age group, with an approximately equal numbers of boys and girls. In both the DG and UG, children were requested to individually make an offer to an anonymous child, and later negotiated the decision as a group of three children making an offer to an anonymous group of children. Their discussions were videotaped, and the order of the two games was counterbalanced. The results revealed that (1) in both games, most children offered much more than predicted by the economic theory, showing a preference for fairness and equality; (2) children’s offers decreased significantly by age in the UG, and these results apparently differed from those of previous studies on children in Western countries. A sex by grade effect was observed in the UG. Males offered more than the females in the 3rd grade, and in higher grades, their offers were similar to those of females. Males’ offers declined with age, while females’ offers were more stable across ages. An order effect was observed in the DG but not in the UG. When the DG was played after the UG, the age effect was similar to that in the latter, implying that children offered less as they grew older. However, when the DG was played before the UG, no significant differences were observed among the age groups. Group offers and individual offers had no significant differences in both games. The results are interpreted as follows. As they grew older, children possibly offered less in the UG due to both moral education and the social influence of the market economy. Younger children were more affected by the values of caring, sharing, and fairness that were taught in school. They were more likely to offer half their share, which revealed their tendency toward fairness. Older children offered less since they had more interaction with the market economy. It is also possible that when children grew older, they developed a better understanding of the value of money and were less willing to share it with others