Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">M?P?LynchEmail author |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, 101 Manchester Hall, 344 Mansfield Road, Storrs, CT, 06269-2054, U.S.A |
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Abstract: | According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the views main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes true as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims. |
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