Spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is impossible |
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Authors: | Jeff Speaks |
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Affiliation: | (1) University of Notre Dame, 100 Malloy Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA |
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Abstract: | Even if spectrum inversion of various sorts is possible, spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is not. So spectrum inversion does not pose a challenge for the intentionalist thesis that, necessarily, within a given sense modality, if two experiences are alike with respect to content, they are also alike with respect to their phenomenal character. On the contrary, reflection on variants of standard cases of spectrum inversion provides a strong argument for intentionalism. Depending on one’s views about the possibility of spectrum inversion, the impossibility of spectrum inversion without a difference in representation can also be used as an argument against a variety of reductive theories of mental representation. |
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