Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument |
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Authors: | Christopher Evan Franklin |
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Affiliation: | (1) Philosophy Department, University of California, Riverside, 900 University Ave, Riverside, CA 92521, USA |
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Abstract: | In this paper I seek to defend libertarianism about free will and moral responsibility against two well-known arguments: the luck argument and the Mind argument. Both of these arguments purport to show that indeterminism is incompatible with the degree of control necessary for free will and moral responsibility. I begin the discussion by elaborating these arguments, clarifying important features of my preferred version of libertarianism—features that will be central to an adequate response to the arguments—and showing why a strategy of reconciliation (often referred to as “deliberative libertarianism”) will not work. I then consider four formulations of the luck argument and find them all wanting. This discussion will place us in a favorable position to understand why the Mind argument also fails. |
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