Guilt feelings and the intelligibility of moral duties |
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Authors: | Andrew Tice Ingram |
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Affiliation: | Chicago-Kent College of Law, 565 W. Adams St., Chicago, IL, 60661 USA |
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Abstract: | G.E.M. Anscombe argued that we should dispense with deontic concepts when doing ethics, if it is psychologically possible to do so. In response, I contend that deontic concepts are constitutive of the common moral experience of guilt. This has two consequences for Anscombe's position. First, seeing that guilt is a deontic emotion, we should recognize that Anscombe's qualification on her thesis applies: psychologically, we need deontology to understand our obligations and hence whether our guilt is warranted. Second, the fact that guilt is a deontic moral emotion debunks Anscombe's claim that deontic concepts are a relic of the Western, religious past: guilt feelings–hence the idea of moral duty as well–can be found in cultures without an ethics of divine command. Modern moral philosophers' interest in oughts and obligations is not an academic hobbyhorse, but a vital concern arising out of a primeval human emotion. |
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Keywords: | Anscombe deontology duty guilt intelligibility moral psychology |
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