Why Nearly Everything Is Knowable A Priori |
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Authors: | Brian Cutter |
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Affiliation: | University of Notre Dame |
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Abstract: | This paper argues that nearly every proposition could in principle be known a priori, with exceptions for necessary falsehoods and a few other odd cases. The argument for this conclusion has two main premises: (i) Odd exceptions aside, if it is possible that p, then it is possible that someone knows innately that p. (ii) Necessarily, whatever is known innately is known a priori. After defending (i) and (ii), I conclude by suggesting that the best way to recover a reasonably limited and interesting conception of the a priori is to adopt an anthropocentric conception of a priori knowability, one that is relativized to our own innate cognitive capacities. However, this proposal has consequences that contradict prevailing views about the a priori. More importantly, this proposal has the result that many philosophical applications of the notion of apriority are misguided. |
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