Flexible moral theories: Complexity,domination, and indeterminacy |
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Authors: | Francisco Garcia-Gibson Eduardo Rivera-López |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Buenos Aires, Puan 480 (C1406CQJ), Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Argentina;2. School of Law, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Av. Figueroa Alcorta 7350 (C1428BIJ), Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Argentina IIF-SADAF CONICET, Bulnes 642 (C1176ABL), Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Argentina |
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Abstract: | In this article we identify three previously unnoticed problems with flexible moral theories, i.e., theories according to which different moral rules apply when there is full compliance and when there is partial compliance. The first problem is that flexible theories are necessarily very complex, which undermines their ability to motivate and guide action. The second problem is that flexible theories allow for a troubling kind of (moral) domination: the duties an agent has depend on other agents' willingness to comply. Finally, flexible theories introduce indeterminacy: it is sometimes impossible to determine which moral rules apply. When agents stand at the threshold—i.e., when a different rule would apply if a single additional act of noncompliance took place—it is impossible to determine which rule should apply. |
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Keywords: | complexity domination flexible theories indeterminacy partial compliance |
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