Von Wright and Wittgenstein on (the Varieties of) Goodness and Family Resemblance: A Constructive Rejoinder to Klagge (2018) |
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Authors: | Lassi Jakola |
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Affiliation: | University of Helsinki |
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Abstract: | James C. Klagge (2018) readings of G. H. von Wright's and Wittgenstein's views concerning goodness and family resemblance are criticised and new interpretations are provided: Pace Klagge, (i) von Wright's arguments against goodness as a family-resemblance concept do not concern cases of goodness but the interrelations between the conceptual varieties of goodness; (ii) Wittgenstein did not endorse a ‘constitutivist account of goodness’ in his 1933 lectures; and (iii) Wittgenstein did not come close to Stevenson's emotivism in his Philosophical Investigations. Rather, Wittgenstein's later remarks on goodness may be read as ‘objects of comparison’ (PI §130), implying no strong theoretical commitments. |
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