An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence |
| |
Authors: | Jacob Stegenga |
| |
Affiliation: | 1. Department of Philosophy, University of California San Diego, 9500 Gilman Dr, La Jolla, CA, 92093, USA
|
| |
Abstract: | Amalgamating evidence of different kinds for the same hypothesis into an overall confirmation is analogous, I argue, to amalgamating individuals’ preferences into a group preference. The latter faces well-known impossibility theorems, most famously “Arrow’s Theorem”. Once the analogy between amalgamating evidence and amalgamating preferences is tight, it is obvious that amalgamating evidence might face a theorem similar to Arrow’s. I prove that this is so, and end by discussing the plausibility of the axioms required for the theorem. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|