A Truthmaker Indispensability Argument |
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Authors: | Sam Baron |
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Affiliation: | 1. School of Philosophical and Historical Enquiry, University of Sydney, Quadrangle A14, Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia
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Abstract: | Recently, nominalists have made a case against the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism by taking issue with Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. In this paper I propose and defend an indispensability argument founded on an alternative criterion of ontological commitment: that advocated by David Armstrong. By defending such an argument I place the burden back onto the nominalist to defend her favourite criterion of ontological commitment and, furthermore, show that criterion cannot be used to formulate a plausible form of the indispensability argument. |
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