Mistakes and Mental Disturbances: Pleasants, Wittgenstein, and Basic Moral Certainty |
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Authors: | Robert Greenleaf Brice |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Philosophy, Loyola University New Orleans, New Orleans, LA, USA
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Abstract: | In his article, “Wittgenstein and Basic Moral Certainty,” Nigel Pleasants argues that killing an innocent, non-threatening person is wrong. It is, he argues, “a basic moral certainty.” He believes our basic moral certainties play the “same kind of foundational role as our] basic empirical certainties] do.” I believe this is mistaken. There is not “simply one kind of foundational role” that certainty plays. While I think Pleasants is right to affiliate his proposition with a Wittgensteinian form of certainty, he exposes himself to a tension that exists in On Certainty regarding how we acquire it: is certainty natural, is it social? In this paper, I present two ways in which we come to possess certainty: a bottom-up approach, where certainty is part of our instinctual predisposition, and a top-down approach, where certainty is acquired through positive reinforcement by family and culture. |
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