The moral obligations of reasonable non-believers |
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Authors: | Wes Morriston |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado at Boulder, 169 Hellems, 232 UCB, Boulder, CO, USA |
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Abstract: | People who do not believe that there is a God constitute an obvious problem for divine command metaethics. They have moral
obligations, and are often enough aware of having them. Yet it is not easy to think of such persons as “hearing” divine commands.
This makes it hard to see how a divine command theory can offer a completely general account of the nature of moral obligation.
The present paper takes a close look at this issue as it emerges in the context of the most recent version of Robert Adams’
modified divine command theory. I argue that, despite a valiant attempt to do so, Adams does not succeed in giving an adequate
account of the moral obligations of non-believers. More generally, I claim that if divine commands are construed as genuine
speech acts, theists are well advised not to adopt a divine command theory. |
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Keywords: | God Morality Obligation Divine Command Metaethics |
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