Reid's Non‐Humean Theory of Moral Motives |
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Authors: | Esther Engels Kroeker |
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Affiliation: | Pieter Gillis Centre for Pluralistic Reflection and the Centre for EthicsUniversity of Antwerp |
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Abstract: | Contrary to the widespread view that Reid and Hume agree that reason, alone, is inert, I argue that they disagree on this point. Both accept that reason plays a role in forming moral sentiments, and that affections are components of moral evaluations. However, I show that for Reid moral evaluations (comprised of moral judgments and moral affections) are different from moral motives (which are not comprised of affections). Moral motives for Reid are mind‐independent states of affairs that are grasped by reason and do not require affections to influence human beings. Reid hence holds a non‐Humean theory in which reason, alone, is not inert. |
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