Kuhn and the science of religion

Ever since the challenge to the ‘received’ view of the philosophy of science—a view epitomized by Karl Popper and Carl Hempel—the status of science has been questioned. If radical critics of the received view—critics including Kuhn, Laudan, Feyerabend, the Edinburgh Strong Programme, and Latour—are right, can science, which means natural science, still be considered objective? Can it still be deemed the model of objectivity to be emulated by the social sciences and even by the humanities? Because religious studies is commonly assumed to fall short of the standards of objectivity of the natural sciences and even of the social sciences, what bearing does criticism of conventional philosophy of science have on it? Specifically, can the religionist approach to religion, the approach that purports to be the sole appropriate one for religious studies, be defended? Does radical philosophy of science, by challenging the objectivity of scientific claims, make the world safe for religious ones? This article will focus on the philosophy of Thomas Kuhn and will seek to determine what use defenders of religious studies can make of it.