Conflicting social paradigms of human freedom and the problem of justification

In recent work, Rawls, Nozick, and the ‘democratic‐socialist’ theory of Markovi? and Gould, attempt to ground rival models of just economic relations on the basis of conflicting interpretations of human freedom. Beginning with a philosophical conception of humans as essentially free beings, each derives a different system of basic rights and freedoms: (1) the familiar democratic civil and political rights of citizenship in the West (Rawls); (2) the classical bourgeois market freedoms ‐ ‘life, liberty, and property’ (Nozick); and (3) democratic socialist rights of self‐management of the work‐place (Gould and Markovi?). I argue that each of these theorists implicitly assumes a different but ungrounded ’social paradigm of human agency’ concerning the particular forms of human choice which are singled out as most important for a free, human life. None of these theories contains the methodological resources for showing why the forms of human agency it ‘emancipates’ are more important than the forms it suppresses or ignores. In order to overcome this impasse and provide a way of evaluating such rival paradigms of free agency, I elaborate a methodology based on the idea that a free society must provide its members with ‘equality in the social bases of self‐respect’. I use this methodology to argue that all three of the above conceptions are blind to problems of human agency, freedom, and dignity posed by the modern phenomena of welfare dependency, unemployment, and a self‐stultifying division of labor.