I. Some criticisms of the katzian metatheory of semantics

C. Fred Alford contends that the manner in which I objected to Feyerabend's democratic relativism is vulnerable to Feyerabend's rhetorical strategy, and that a better strategy would be to show that Feyerabend fails to demonstrate that democratic relativism is desirable. I reply in defense of the ‘plausibility’ issue on the grounds that Feyerabend's theory lends itself to uses (and abuses) beyond Utopian critique (in Alford's sense). I argue that it is the fact that critics ‐ myself included ‐ have assumed the burden of demonstrating the impossibility of Feyerabend's political theory that has led to the stalemate Alford describes, and that we may retain the ‘plausibility’ question while avoiding the stalemate by placing the burden of argument on Feyerabend to show that his theory is plausible.