Depth of intention

The paper attempts to reconstruct some notions of Naess's semantics, and at the same time to relate them to more recent developments. On Naess's view, there is no such thing as a language in the sense of a shared structure which determines clear‐cut literal meanings like Fregean Gedanken or propositions. We use words, and try to interpret each other; but there is no a priori or intuitive basis for secure and precise knowledge about language. Interpretation or understanding, as well as thinking and perception, involve discrimination at higher or lower levels. There is neither a ceiling of crystal‐clear propositions nor a floor of ‘given’ sensations or ‘objective’ stimuli independent of categorizations and discriminations, which might serve as a bridge for translation or interpretation between the conceptual‐perceptual schemes of individuals. The notions of ‘concept’, ‘conceptual framework’, ‘situation’, ‘situation type’ and ‘proposition’ are defined, with some reliance on Barwise and Perry's situation semantics. Two notions of accessibility of situation types are defined; one as constructibility of the type at a given level of discrimination, i.e. in terms of objects discerned and concepts discriminated; the other as intelligibility of the type. Intelligibility entails constructibility, but not conversely. A type of situation may be constructible at some person's level of discrimination, but not coherently intelligible to him. On this basis, a logic of senses or truth‐conditions for uses of expressions is developed, and a logic of interpretations of uses. The central notions of Naessian semantics are defined: ambiguity and direction of interpretation, level of discrimination and depth of intention.