Motor Intentionality and its Primordiality

Is intentionality possible without representation? This paper considers the conditions under which intentionality without representation could occur and what sort of perceptual content such intentionality would have. In addition, it considers the constraints on non‐representational intentional content in organisms that have representation. The paper is divided into three parts. The first section compares and contrasts two opposed positions on non‐representational intentionality, those of Herbert Dreyfus and John Searle. The second section reviews a neurobiological model that accommodates the possibility of non‐representational perceptual content. The final section provides a puzzle for theories of non‐representational perceptual content, specifically in connection with the perception of representations. The puzzle of representation and perception illustrates a further need for all theories of perception, both philosophical and scientific: to provide a more finely developed definition of the notion of representation.