Thought and action

There are perennial disputes about the scope of reason in human affairs. Some say we can never reason about ends; we can reason only about means. Others argue that this Humean view is mistaken. Still others claim that the crucial and typical use of ‘reason’ in moral contexts is both moralistic and somehow illusory. It seems to me that there are serious confusions in all these traditional contentions. Reason is not the slave of the passions, and although there is a distinctive use of ‘reason’ in moral contexts there is nothing moralistic or illusory about it. The temptation to think there is is dispelled once proper note is taken of 1) the distinction between causes and reasons, 2) the proper context of causal explanations and explanations and justifications by reasons, 3) the distinctive roles of ‘I want...’ and ‘I wish...’ and 4) the diverse, context‐dependent, uses of ‘reason’.