Acquisition functions in contingency judgment |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Electrical Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, PR China;2. State Grid Electric Power Research Institute, Nanjing 211000, PR China;1. Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience Lab (DCNL), Brain Institute of Rio Grande do Sul (InsCer), Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil;2. Graduate Program in Psychology, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil;3. Graduate Program in Pediatrics and Child Health, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil;1. Neurobiology of Alcohol Laboratory, Campbell Family Mental Health Research Institute, Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, Toronto, Canada;2. Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology, University of Toronto, Canada;3. Department of Psychiatry, University of Toronto, Canada;1. School of Humanities and Economic Management, China University of Geosciences, Beijing, 100083, China;2. Key Laboratory of Carrying Capacity Assessment for Resource and Environment, Ministry of Land and Resources (Chinese Academy of Land and Resource Economics, China University of Geosciences Beijing), Beijing, 100083, China;3. Lab of Resources and Environmental Management, China University of Geosciences, Beijing, 100083, China;4. School of Earth Sciences and Resources, China University of Geosciences, Beijing, 100083, China |
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| Abstract: | Two experiments investigated the way in which judgments of the extent to which an action caused an outcome changed as more experience of the actionoutcome contingency was presented. In the first experiment judgments increased across trials when there was a positive contingency and decreased when there was a negative contingency. In noncontingent situations judgments were biased by the overall probability of the outcome. In the second experiment the changes across trials under positive and negative contingencies persisted even when the subjects were given the opportunity to dissociate their causality judgments from their degree of confidence in those judgments. The results are at variance with the dP and dD theories which attempt to account for causality judgments in terms of statistical rules based on the probabilities or frequencies of the relevant events. If such theories were modified, however, to take account of the regression of the subjects' estimates onto the actual probabilities or frequencies, then the data could be accommodated. On the other hand, a simple associative view is also able to account for the data. |
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