Using Wittgenstein to Respecify Constructivism |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">David?FrancisEmail author |
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Institution: | (1) Dept. of Sociology, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK |
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Abstract: | Taking its orientation from Peter Winch, this article critiques from a Wittgensteinian point of view some “theoreticist” tendencies
within constructivism. At the heart of constructivism is the deeply Wittgensteinian idea that the world as we know and understand
it is the product of human intelligence and interests. The usefulness of this idea can be vitiated by a failure to distinguish
conceptual from empirical questions. I argue that such a failure characterises two influential constructivist theories, those
of Ernst von Glasersfeld and David Bloor. These are considered in turn. Both theories seek to give a general, causal account
of knowledge: von Glasersfeld's in term of cognitive subjectivity, Bloor's in terms of social agreement. Ironically, given
that both writers cite Wittgenstein as a source of theoretical inspiration, assumptions of both theories run counter to key
Wittgensteinian arguments. To show that Wittgenstein's views offer no solace to the realist, the article closes with a brief
consideration of John Searle's theory of knowledge. |
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