Dynamical Systems Theory as an Approach to Mental Causation |
| |
Authors: | Tjeerd Van De Laar |
| |
Institution: | (1) Faculty of Philosophy, Radboud University Nijmegen, Erasmusgebouw 16.21, Erasmusplein 1, Postbus 9103, 6500, HD, Nijmegen, The Netherlands |
| |
Abstract: | Summary Dynamical systems theory (DST) is gaining popularity in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Recently several authors
(e.g. J.A.S. Kelso, 1995; A. Juarrero, 1999; F. Varela and E. Thompson, 2001) offered a DST approach to mental causation as
an alternative for models of mental causation in the line of Jaegwon Kim (e.g. 1998). They claim that some dynamical systems
exhibit a form of global to local determination or downward causation in that the large-scale, global activity of the system governs or constrains local interactions. This form of downward causation is the key to the DST model of mental causation. In this paper I evaluate
the DST approach to mental causation. I will argue that the main problem for current DST approaches to mental causation is
that they lack a clear metaphysics. I propose one metaphysical framework (Gillett, 2002a/b/c) that might deal with this deficiency. |
| |
Keywords: | dimensioned realization downward causation downward determination dynamical systems theory mental causation |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|