A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Daniel?DoviakEmail author |
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Institution: | (1) Muhlenberg College, Allentown, PA, USA |
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Abstract: | In Morals From Motives, Michael Slote defends an agent-based theory of right action according to which right acts are those that express virtuous
motives like benevolence or care. Critics have claimed that Slote’s view— and agent-based views more generally— cannot account
for several basic tenets of commonsense morality. In particular, the critics maintain that agent-based theories: (i) violate
the deontic axiom that “ought” implies “can”, (ii) cannot allow for a person’s doing the right thing for the wrong reason,
and (iii) do not yield clear verdicts in a number of cases involving “conflicting motives” and “motivational over-determination”.
In this paper I develop a new agent-based theory of right action designed to avoid the problems presented for Slote’s view.
This view makes morally right action a matter of expressing an optimal balance of virtue over vice and commands agents in
each situation to improve their degree of excellence to the greatest extent possible. |
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