The Problem of Deep Competitors and the Pursuit of Epistemically Utopian Truths |
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Authors: | Timothy D Lyons |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapolis, Indianapolis, IN, USA |
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Abstract: | According to standard scientific realism, science seeks truth and we can justifiably believe that our successful theories
achieve, or at least approximate, that goal. In this paper, I discuss the implications of the following competitor thesis:
Any theory we may favor has competitors such that we cannot justifiably deny that they are approximately true. After defending
that thesis, I articulate three specific threats it poses for standard scientific realism; one is epistemic, the other two
are axiological (that is, pertaining to the claim that science seeks truth). I also flag an additional axiological “challenge,”
that of how one might justify the pursuit of a primary aim, such as truth. Bracketing epistemic realism, I argue that the
axiological threats can be addressed by embracing a refined realist axiological hypothesis, one that specifies a specific
subclass of true claims sought in science. And after identifying three potential responses to the axiological “challenge,”
I contend that, while standard axiological realism appears to lack the resources required to utilize any of the responses,
the refined realist axiology I embrace is well suited to each. |
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