Irreplaceability and the intentionality of sexual arousal

Philosophers writing about the intentionality of sexual arousal have generally been of two minds. One approach likens it to an appetite that aims at a distinctive type of gratification. A second treats it as the attempt, through a process of embodiment, to unite with a transcendental self. The first model lays stress on the fungibility of the object of sexual desire: the body and certain of its parts. The latter sees arousal as burdened with impossible satisfaction conditions based on an extravagant metaphysics of the self. In this paper, I defend an account that emphasizes the cooperative element in arousal and assimilates its content to that of other such social activities. This preserves the central place of the self in the intentionality of arousal in a way that is metaphysically benign and that ultimately avoids treating sex as a sui generis form of human interaction.