The Nature and Disvalue of Injury |
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Authors: | Seth Lazar |
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Institution: | (1) Nuffield College and Department of Politics, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK |
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Abstract: | This paper explicates a conception of injury as right-violation, which allows us to distinguish between setbacks to interests
that should, and should not, be the concern of theories of justice. It begins by introducing a hybrid theory of rights, grounded
in (a) the mobilisation of our moral equality to (b) protect our most important interests, and shows how violations of rights
are the concern of justice, while setbacks where one of the twin grounds of rights is defeated are not. It then looks more
closely at the substantive moral components of injury, namely harm—damage to one’s interests—and wrong—disrespect for one’s
moral equality. It argues that, on the hybrid conception of rights, harm and wrong are individually necessary and jointly
sufficient components of injury, and the disvalue of neither is reducible to the other—in particular, it is a mistake to construe
the disrespect identified by wrong as another damaged interest. Finally, it distinguishes between the public and private dimensions
of harm and wrong, and makes some preliminary suggestions as to whether the remedy for these different dimensions should lie
in criminal, distributive, or corrective justice. |
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Keywords: | |
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