Socrates on Reason, Appetite and Passion: A Response to Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Socratic Moral Psychology

Section 1 of this essay distinguishes between four interpretations of Socratic intellectualism, which are, very roughly: (1) a version in which on any given occasion desire, and then action, is determined by what we think will turn out best for us, that being what we all, always, really desire; (2) a version in which on any given occasion action is determined by what we think will best satisfy our permanent desire for what is really best for us; (3) a version formed by the assimilation of (2) to (1), labelled the ??standard?? version?? by Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, and treated by them as a single alternative to their own interpretation; and (4) Brickhouse and Smith??s own version. Section 2 considers, in particular, Brickhouse and Smith??s handling of the ??appetites and passions??, which is the most distinctive feature of interpretation (4). Section 3 discusses Brickhouse and Smith??s defence of ??Socratic studies?? in its historical context, and assesses the contribution made by their distinctive interpretation of ??the philosophy of Socrates??. One question raised in this section, and one that is clearly fundamental to the existence of ??Socratic studies??, is how different Brickhouse and Smith??s Socrates turns out to be from Plato himself, i.e., the Plato of the post-??Socratic?? dialogues; to which the answer offered is that on Brickhouse and Smith??s interpretation Socratic moral psychology becomes rather less distinguishable from its ??Platonic?? counterpart??as that is currently understood??than it is on the interpretation(s) they oppose.