AGAINST CARTESIAN MISTRUST: CAVELL,HUSSERL AND THE OTHER MIND SCEPTIC |
| |
Authors: | Lilian Alweiss |
| |
Affiliation: | Department of Philosophy School of Social Sciences and Philosophy Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland alweissl@tcd.ie |
| |
Abstract: | This paper asks whether we should still be haunted by scepticism about other minds. It draws on the writings of Cavell and Husserl to show that there is some truth in the Cartesian premise that has given rise to scepticism about other minds, namely, that our self‐awareness is of a fundamentally different type from our awareness of objects and other subjects. While this leads Cavell to argue that there is a truth to scepticism, it proves the opposite to Husserl, viz. that other minds scepticism is necessarily non‐sensical. The paper shows why Husserl's position is more convincing than Cavell's. 1 |
| |
Keywords: | |
|
|