Intention Attribution in Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment |
| |
Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Chew?Sim?CheeEmail author Tamar?Murachver |
| |
Institution: | (1) University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand;(2) Faculty of Education and Human Development, Sultan Idris Education University, 35900 Tanjong Malim, Perak, Malaysia |
| |
Abstract: | The present research investigated how children would weigh moral acts pitted against intent, across different moral domains.
Twenty primary school children were recruited from an existing database and evaluated a set of acts (good-bad) on the basis
of intent (good-bad) across three domains (harm, fairness, and social convention) on a 7-point Likert scale. The study found
that children took into account the intention of an agent. Interestingly, intent has a differential effect on the evaluation
of acts; it was more pronounced for good acts, but less so for bad acts. For the evaluation of bad acts, children placed greater
weight on the intrinsic nature of the act rather than the protagonist’s intent. Conversely, whether the intent is good or
bad influenced the evaluation of good acts to a greater extent. These findings not only lend support to the domain-specific
view of moral reasoning but also show that children do not attribute intent in a unitary manner within theory of mind. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|