Lottery judgments: A philosophical and experimental study |
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| Authors: | Philip A. Ebert Martin Smith Ian Durbach |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Law and Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling, UK;2. University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK;3. Department of Statistical Sciences, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa;4. African Institute for Mathematical Sciences, Cape Town, South Africa |
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| Abstract: | In this paper, we present the results of two surveys that investigate subjects’ judgments about what can be known or justifiably believed about lottery outcomes on the basis of statistical evidence, testimonial evidence, and “mixed” evidence, while considering possible anchoring and priming effects. We discuss these results in light of seven distinct hypotheses that capture various claims made by philosophers about lay people’s lottery judgments. We conclude by summarizing the main findings, pointing to future research, and comparing our findings to recent studies by Turri and Friedman. |
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| Keywords: | Behavioral decision-making justified belief knowledge lottery proposition statistical evidence testimonial evidence |
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