Perelman's rhetorical foundation of philosophy |
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Authors: | Rui Alexandre Lal A Martins Grácio |
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Affiliation: | (1) Rua Santos Rocha, No. 15, 2nd esq., 3000 Coimbra, Portugal |
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Abstract: | This article is a Gadamer-Perelman's debate. The author points out the limits of the gadamerian's hermeneutic conception of philosophy and criticizes this conception from Perelman's new rhetoric point of view. Instead of speaking of truth as an ontological originary experience, the rhetorical foundation of philosophy allows us to say that in philosophy the important is the contrastation and the confrontation of criteria and that, for that reason, philosophy is above all characterized by discussibility.Philosophical argumentation, like juridical argumentation, constitutes applications, to different domains, of a theory of argumentation which we consider as a new rhetoric.By identifying this theory with the general theory of persuasive speech, which seeks to obtain the intellectual as well as the emotional adherence of an audience, no matter which, we state that all speeches which do not aspire to an impersonal validity proceed from rhetoric. (Ch. Perelman,L'empire rhétorique, p. 177).But, if one does not admit that the philosophical thesis may be founded on evident intuitions, it will be necessary to reccur to argumentative technics to make them prevail. The new rhetoric then becomes the indispensable tool of philosophy. (Ch. Perelman,L'empire rhétorique, p. 21). |
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Keywords: | Reasonable discussibility experience philosophical questions rationality rhetorical foundation philosophical taking of position hermeneutics phenomenology new rhetoric |
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