Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases |
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Authors: | David Palmer |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Philosophy, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 801 McClung Tower, Knoxville, TN, 37996, USA
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Abstract: | According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In what follows, I want to defend this principle against an apparent counterexample offered recently by Derk Pereboom (Living without free will, 2001; Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29:228?C247, 2005). Pereboom??s case, a variant of what are known as ??Frankfurt cases,?? is important for it attempts to overcome a dilemma posed for earlier alleged counterexamples to PAP. However, I will argue that by paying closer attention to the details of Pereboom??s example, we see that his example fails to show a way between the horns of the dilemma posed for the earlier Frankfurt examples. |
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