Actual truth,possible knowledge |
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| Authors: | Wlodek Rabinowicz Krister Segerberg |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Uppsala University, Sweden
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| Abstract: | The well-known argument of Frederick Fitch, purporting to show that verificationism (=  Truth implies knowability ) entails the absurd conclusion that all the truths are known, has been disarmed by Dorothy Edgington's suggestion that the proper formulation of verificationism presupposes that we make use of anactuality operator along with the standardly invoked epistemic and modal operators. According to her interpretation of verificationism, the actual truth of a proposition implies that it could be known in some possible situation that the proposition holds in theactual situation. Thus, suppose that our object language contains the operatorA — it is actually the case that ... — with the following truth condition:  vA iff w0, wherew0 stands for the designated world of the model — the actual world. Then we can formalize the verificationist claim as follows:
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