The nature and success of influence attempts in a four-party bargaining relationship

The functioning of a complex four-party bargaining system was subjected to experimental analysis. Two of the bargaining parties, A and B, were defined as having equal power, this power being greater than that of A and B's respective “allies”, X and Y—who also had equal power. The bargaining system was further structured so as to make it desirable for A and B to interact indirectly with each other, via X and Y as intermediaries. Within this paradigm, A and B's relationship with each other (cooperative vs competitive) and X and Y's counterpower vis-à-vis A and B (high vs low) were manipulated in a 2 × 2 factorial design. It was found, as predicted, that the system functioned most effectively (in terms of outcome levels and degree of positive affect among the four parties) when A and B were cooperatively oriented, and X and Y had low counter-power. The system functioned least effectively when A and B were competitive and their “allies'” counterpower was high. On the other hand, a number of unexpected findings emerged with respect to the kinds of influence attempts directed by A and B at X and Y. Among the more provocative of these was the fact that cooperative A and B's, in contrast with those receiving a competitive induction, made the most frequent use not only of promises but threats as well.