Responsibility and the Brain Sciences |
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Authors: | Felipe De Brigard Eric Mandelbaum David Ripley |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, UNC/Chapel Hill, CB #3125, Caldwell Hall, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3125, USA;; |
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Abstract: | Some theorists think that the more we get to know about the neural underpinnings of our behaviors, the less likely we will
be to hold people responsible for their actions. This intuition has driven some to suspect that as neuroscience gains insight
into the neurological causes of our actions, people will cease to view others as morally responsible for their actions, thus
creating a troubling quandary for our legal system. This paper provides empirical evidence against such intuitions. Particularly,
our studies of folk intuitions suggest that (1) when the causes of an action are described in neurological terms, they are
not found to be any more exculpatory than when described in psychological terms, and (2) agents are not held fully responsible
even for actions that are fully neurologically caused. |
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