Providing Foundations for Coherentism |
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| Authors: | Sven Ove Hansson and Erik J Olsson |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, 10691 Stockholm, Sweden;(2) Fachgruppe Philosophie, Universit?t Konstanz, D-78457 Konstanz, Germany |
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| Abstract: | We prove that four theses commonly associated with coherentism are incompatible with the representation of a belief state
as a logically closed set of sentences. The result is applied to the conventional coherence interpretation of the AGM theory
of belief revision, which appears not to be tenable. Our argument also counts against the coherentistic acceptability of a
certain form of propositional holism. We argue that the problems arise as an effect of ignoring the distinction between derived
and non-derived beliefs, and we suggest that the kind of coherence relevant to epistemic justification is the coherence of
non-derived beliefs.
This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. |
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