Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis versus Williamson on modal knowledge |
| |
Authors: | Andrea Sauchelli |
| |
Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Arts Tower, Western Bank, Sheffield, S10 2TN, UK |
| |
Abstract: | The epistemology of modality is gradually coming to play a central role in general discussions about modality. This paper is a contribution in this direction, in particular I draw a comparison between Lewis’s Modal realism and Timothy Williamson’s recent account of modality in terms of counterfactual thinking. In order to have criteria of evaluation, I also formulate four requirements which are supposed to be met by any theory of modality to be epistemologically adequate. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|