Consciousness and the self-sensing brain: implications for feeling and meaning |
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Authors: | Tannenbaum Arnold S |
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Affiliation: | Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 48109, USA. astannen@umich.edu |
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Abstract: | A number of authors have proposed or alluded to the significance for consciousness of sensing within the brain. This article reviews some of these proposals along with questions that have been raised and argues that consciousness might be understood as a property of a system that functions as a sense in the biological meaning of that term. The sense of consciousness is conceived not as a fixed structure but rather as a structure with variations, consistent with contemporary notions of complexity theory. A sense of consciousness has implications for concepts central to an understanding of consciousness, most notably the concepts of feeling and meaning. William James and others have proposed feeling as a ubiquitous aspect of consciousness. The concept of sensing, like that of feeling, provides a bridge between the organic and phenomenological aspects of consciousness, and the rudiments of meaning can be seen in the symbolizing role of a sense as it relates to adaptive problem solving. |
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