CONTEXTUALISM AND SCEPTICISM: EVEN-HANDEDNESS, FACTIVITY AND SURREPTITIOUSLY RAISING STANDARDS |
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| Authors: | Crispin Wright |
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| Institution: | Arché, AHRB Centre for the Philosophy of Logic, Language, Mathematics and Mind, University of St Andrews, and Department of Philosophy, New York University |
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| Abstract: | The central contentions of this paper are two: first, that contextualism about knowledge cannot fulfil the eirenic promise which, for those who are drawn to it, constitutes, I believe, its main attraction; secondly, that the basic diagnosis of epistemological scepticism as somehow entrapping us, by diverting attention from a surreptitious shift to a special rarefied intellectual context, rests on inattention to the details of the principal sceptical paradoxes. These contentions are consistent with knowledge-contextualism, of some stripe or other, being true. What follows will not bear directly on that. |
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