The ontological status of minimal entities |
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Authors: | Luca Moretti |
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Institution: | (1) Centre for Time, Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, Main Quad A14, Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia |
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Abstract: | Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide
an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization
is inspired by both Schiffer’s notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich’s notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed
to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal
to the inferential role reading of the quantifiers does not dismiss this commitment. I also argue that deflationary existence
is language-dependent existence—this clarifies why minimalists about properties and facts are not realists about these entities
though their language may appear indistinguishable from the language of realists.
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Keywords: | Minimalism Minimal entities Properties Facts Internal quantification Deflationary existence Horwich Hofweber Schiffer |
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