On Categories and A Posteriori Necessity: A Phenomenological Echo |
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Authors: | M. J. Garcia‐Encinas |
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Affiliation: | Dpt. Filosofía I, Edificio de Psicología, Universidad de Granada, , 18011 Granada, Spain |
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Abstract: | This article argues for two related theses. First, it defends a general thesis: any kind of necessity, including metaphysical necessity, can only be known a priori. Second, however, it also argues that the sort of a priori involved in modal metaphysical knowledge is not related to imagination or any sort of so‐called epistemic possibility. Imagination is neither a proof of possibility nor a limit to necessity. Rather, modal metaphysical knowledge is built on intuition of philosophical categories and the structures they form. |
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Keywords: | a priori categories intuition metaphysical necessity |
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