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Synchronic Bayesian updating and the Sleeping Beauty problem: reply to Pust
Authors:Terry Horgan
Affiliation:(1) Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721-0027, USA
Abstract:I maintain, in defending “thirdism,” that Sleeping Beauty should do Bayesian updating after assigning the “preliminary probability” 1/4 to the statement S: “Today is Tuesday and the coin flip is heads.” (This preliminary probability obtains relative to a specific proper subset I of her available information.) Pust objects that her preliminary probability for S is really zero, because she could not be in an epistemic situation in which S is true. I reply that the impossibility of being in such an epistemic situation is irrelevant, because relative to I, statement S nonetheless has degree of evidential support 1/4.
Keywords:Sleeping Beauty  Probability  Epistemic probability  Preliminary probability  Credence  Bayesian updating  Synchronic Bayesian updating
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